Recent Decisions by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 16 Issue 3 Article 5 
1964 
Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Decisions, 16 S. C. L. Rev. 419 (1964). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 




National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent (U.S.S. Ct. 1964)
In 1961 the respondents, residents of Michigan, obtained two
incubators under a lease contract from the petitioner, a Delaware
corporation doing business in New York. The lease, a printed
form of about one page and a half in length, provided in the last
paragraph, appearing just above their signatures, that "the
Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg, 47-21 Forty-first
Street, Long Island City, N. Y., as agent for the purpose of
accepting service of any process within the State of New York."1
The respondents were not acquainted with Florence Weinberg.
In 1962 the petitioner filed a complaint in the federal court
in New York alleging that payments under the lease had not
been made. Summons and complaint were served on Florence
Weinberg. That same day she mailed the summons and complaint
to the respondents.
The respondents moved to quash the service, challenging the
validity of the agency and intimating that Florence Weinberg
was a representative of the petitioner in some capacity. The
motion was granted by the District Court2 on grounds that al-
though the agent had given prompt notice of service of process,
the lease had not explicitly required her to do so, and therefore
the agency had failed. The Court of Appeals affirmed,3 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.4 In a five to four decision the
Court upheld the agency agreement, concluding that Florence
Weinberg was an agent authorized by appointment to receive
service of process within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 (d) (1)r although she was not known to the prin-
1. The paragraph read in its entirety as follows:
This agreement shall be deemed to have been made in Nassau County,
New York, regardless of the order in which the signatures of the parties
shall be affixed hereto, and shall be interpreted, and the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties here determined, in accordance with the laws of the
State of New York; and the Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg,
47-21 Forty-first Street, Long Island City, N. Y., as agent for the purpose
of accepting service of any process within the State of New York.
2. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 30 F.R.D. 3 (E.D.N.Y.
1962).
3. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962).
4. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 372 U.S. 974 (1963).
5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (d) provides, in part:
(d) SUMMONS: PERSONAL SERVICE. The summons and com-
plaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making
service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person,
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally
1
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cipal, and there was no express provision for giving notice to the
principal. Reversed and remanded. National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. zuhent, 84 Sup. Ct. 411 (1964).
The Court stated that it is well settled that parties to a con-
tract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a
given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party,
or to waive notice altogether.6 The prompt acceptance and trans-
mission of the summons and complaint by the agent was suffi-
cient to validate the agency without an explicit previous promise
to do so.
7
This case was distinguished from Wuchter v. Pizzutti8 where
a state statute providing for substituted service on a statutory
agent was held unconstitutional for not expressly requiring no-
tice of service to nonresident defendants. There, there was no
consensual element as there is in this case.
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, was alone of the opinion that
the validity of the agency should be tested by state law rather
than by a federal standard of agency. He then turned to the
nature of such agreements, stating that the holding means in
effect that at the time the lease was executed the respondents
waived all objections to the jurisdiction of a distant court that
could not otherwise reach them, and that such provisions as this
have been refused enforcement before.9 He would bring the lease
into the sphere of contracts of adhesion, specifically referring to
insurance contracts, where the courts have gone to lengths to pro-
tect the individuals assured from arrangements whereby the
companies have attempted to restrict litigation to the courts of
their home offices.10 Mr. Justice Black continued that the hold-
ing brings up constitutional questions of whether the respondents
will be denied due process of law. Under the doctrine of Pen-
noyer v. Neff" a state court is without power to serve its process
outside the state boundaries so as to compel a resident of another
or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
6. See e.g., Kenny Construction Co. v. Allen, 248 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Bowles v. Schmitt & Co., Inc., 170 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1948); Gilbert v. Burn-
stine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
7. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 274 (3d ed. 1959).
8. 276 U.S. 13 (1927).
9. See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876) ; Insurance Co. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72
Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856); 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 1445.
10. See Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856).
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
[Vol. 16
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss3/5
RECENT DECISIONS
state to appear against his will in an action where a personal
judgment is sought against him. Being in the federal courts
solely by diversity of citizenship, the rights of the respondents
should be preserved as they would be under their state courts,
thereby bringing them under the Pennoyer doctrine. But even
here, consent would make the appointment valid.1 2 There is no
violation of due process where there is consent.13 Mr. Justice
Black challenged the respondents' consent as being a fiction.
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Goldberg joined, objected mainly in that he would re-
quire an express provision for notice to the principal, in line with
the reasoning of the lWuchter case, and more proof of a knowing
and intelligent consent to be sued in another state than a mere
signature.
The purpose of requiring an express provision for notice is
to protect the principal from the possibility of suffering a de-
fault judgment.14 With the receipt of actual notice in the present
case that purpose is satisfied. Moreover, the federal rules pro-
vide safeguards for setting aside default judgments, and relief
from final judgment.15 If a party may waive service altogether
by consent, a party may also take the risk of not receiving
notice.'
0
The majority held the agency valid on contractual principles
although the objections raised were directed in the main to the
unrealized, but possible, danger of abuse. *Where attempts to
restrict jurisdiction or to forego privileges conferred by positive
law have been held unenforceable, it has been done in a desire
to protect weak parties from coercive contractual methods of
dispartely more powerful parties. 17 In perhaps only slightly less
measure, but with increasing momentum, the courts have recog-
nized that by consent freely given parties may waive jurisdiction
and notice of service.' 8 It appears that the test is one of reason-
ableness.19 It does not seem unreasonable that a contract, not
overly long and without fine print, was made in good faith.
12. Id. at 735.
13. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
14. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 41 (1962).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c); FED. R_ CIV. P. 60(b).
16. See Green Mountain College v. Levine, 120 Vt. 332, 139 A.2d 822 (1958)
(dictum).
17. EHRENZWEiG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 151.
18. See e.g., 42 Am. JUR. Process § 51, p. 42; ScoTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PaO-
cFnuRa pp. 39-41 (1922); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 14(a) (1942); Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1878) (dictum).
19. See EHRENZWEiG, op. cit. .supra note 14.
1961]
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Agricultural operations of a scope and enterprise to enable them
to secure special equipment are not necessarily at the mercy of
powerful and sharp contractual methods. Rather, the commer-
cial nature of the transaction indicates more reasonably a bargain
between equals.
The respondents have not made the contention of fraud or
misrepresentation, nor that there was an invasion of their rights,
but rather that they should be allowed to escape their obligation
because of a defect pursuant to its terms. A contrary holding
would have the effect of rewriting a contract freely entered into
in the course of business. There would be an immediate altera-
tion of contractual rights in apprehension of anticipated mal-
conformance to an uncertain public policy. By this decision some
of that uncertainty is removed. It is evident that parties to a
private contract may be bound to submit to a certain jurisdic-
tion and that valid service may be effectuated through a contrac-
tually stipulated agent for that purpose.
RALPH C. Robinson, Jn.
[Vol. 16
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INSURANCE-UNINSURED MOTORIST ACT-PUNITIVE
DAMAGES UNDER UNINSURED MOTORIST
ENDORSEMENT
Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co..(S.C. 1964)
Suit was brought under the South Carolina Uninsured Motor-
ist Act' to require payment, by the plaintiff's insurance company,
of a judgment awarded against an uninsured motorist for $5,000
actual and $2,500 punitive damages. On appeal from a circuit
court ruling that the entire amount be paid, HELD: reversed.
"There is no provision in the Uninsured Motorist Statutes which,
either expressly or by implication, requires that the uninsured
motorist endorsement 2 must insure against any and all liability."
Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 184 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1964). This
holding has been expressly overruled by an amendment to Sec-
tion 46-750.11 of the S. C. CODE (1962). The amending language
states "the term 'damages' shall include both actual and punitive
damages."
The question of whether or not the insurance carrier is re-
quired to pay the portion of the judgment which is for punitive
damages, under the South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Act,
was one of novel impression.
In determining the purpose of the act, the court undoubtedly
reached the correct conclusion. Virginia, Washington, and Con-
necticut have stated the purpose of the uninsured motorist cov-
erage as being: (1) Virginia--"to provide adequate compensation
for injured insureds when other sources are lacking,"3 "to correct
the fact that certain operators did not have any insurance,"4 and,
"not to provide the uninsured motorist with insurance cover-
age."5 (2) Washington--"to provide financial recompense to
innocent persons who are injured because of wrongful conduct
of uninsured motorists."8 (3) Connecticut---"to furnish persons
1. The Uninsured Motorist Act, patterned after the Virginia act, was enacted
in 1959, amended in minor respects in 1960, (51 STAT. 1902), amended again in
1963, (53 STAT. 526), and further amended in 1964, Bill No. R941, S578. As
amended in 1960 and prior to the 1963 amendment, the act is contained in Sec-
tion 46-750.11 and Sections 46-750.14 through 46-750.18 of the S.C.CoDE Ann.
(1962).
2. S.C.CoDE Ann. 46-750.13 (1962).
3. Hobbs v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Va. 1962).
4. Drewry v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 201 Va. 231, 129 S.E.2d 681
(1963).
5. Horne v. Superior Life Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962);
Hobbs v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349, (W.D. Va. 1962).
6. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ransom, 59 Wash. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867
(1962).
5
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injured through use by others of (uninsured) motor vehicles
upon public highways security for payment of damages."
7
South Carolina adopted the statutory language of the Unin-
sured Motorist Act from Virginia; the logical inference is that
the purpose of the act, as stated by Virginia, would be adopted
by the legislature.
The decision in the Laird case follows both the expressed legis-
lative intent and the existing common law in South Carolina,
though the rule used by the court in reaching this result (i.e.,
courts must not engage in judicial legislation; Creecl v. South
Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645,
1942), is not the strongest justification upon which to base the
decision.
Upon examination of the specific statutory language relating
to damages allowed under the Uninsured Motorist Act, i.e.,
"... all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages . . .,"I it becomes apparent that the words
"all sums" relate to the "damages" the insured is "legally en-
titled" to recover. In brief, the insured is allowed to recover "all
damages."
"In legal contemplation, the term 'damages' is the sum of
money which the Law awards or imposes as pecuniary compen-
sation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong
sustained as a consequence either of a breach of contractual rela-
tion or a tortious act."9 The South Carolina Supreme Court has
defined the word "damages" in the following manner: "Damages
are compensation given by the jury for an injury or wrong sus-
tained by the complaining party before the action is brought" ;1o
and as "Pecuniary compensation for injury recovered in an
action at law.""1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines "damages"
as "the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained an
injury.
1 2
With the purpose of the act established and the key word in
the statutory language defined, the next step is to combine the
two elements. The court did this in the case of Greenville Enter-
prise, Inc. v. Jennings's where it said: "All rules for statutory
7. Clark v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 148 Conn. 15, 166 A.2d 713 (1960).
8. S.C.CODE, ANN. § 46-750.14 (1962).
9. 15 AI.JuR. 387, Damages, § 2, (1938).
10. McCoy v. Lemon, 11 Rich. L. 165 (S.C. 1856).
11. Stallings v. Corbett, 2 Speers 613 (S.C. 1844).
12. Third Revision, Eighth Edition, 1914; p. 749.
13. 210 S.C. 163, 41 S.E.2d 868 (1947).
[Vol. 16
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construction are servient to the one that the legislative intent
must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language
used which must be construed in the light of the intended pur-
pose." In the present case, the statute was enacted with the intent
to avail the insured of compensatory damages, and the words
used by the legislature convey that intent when their common
meaning is employed. With these two facts in mind, the use of
the rule in the Creech case seems unnecessary, particularly in
view of the fact that the reasoning outlined above produces the
same result as reached in the Laird case.
Regardless of the basis of the decision, the fact remains that
it was correct in the light of existing law, and one possible
reason for the use of the Creech rule may have been a desire
on the part of the court to encourage legislative clarification
of the particular language in question with regard to that law.
If that was indeed their aim, they were highly successful.
Following the Laird decision the Senate Judiciary Committee
recommended an amendment to the Uninsured Motorist Act
which would absolve the insurance carriers of liability for puni-
tive damages. 14 The Legislature, however, did not see fit to adopt
the Committee's proposal, and on March 21, 1964, the Governor
signed a bill which reads: "Section 46-750.11 of the 1962
Code . . . is further amended by adding at the end of subsection
(3) the following subitem. '(D) The term "damages" shall in-
clude both actual and punitive damages.' ',,1
The bill became effective upon signature and completely nulli-
fied the Laird decision. Not only did it have that effect, but it
placed South Carolina in a position diametrically opposed to the
various other states with regard to the coverage provided by the
Uninsured Motorist Act.
This is not to say the position is untenable, but there are con-
siderations which indicate the inclusion of punitive damages
under the Uninsured Motorist Act may have adverse effects on
the insurers.
The fee paid by uninsured motorists ($20.00) each year is
placed in a fund from which payments are made to the insurance
companies pro-rata on the basis of total premiums written per
year. Obviously, the amount in the fund directly controls the
amount paid to the companies. As planned, the Uninsured Motor-
14. Senate Bill No. 578, Report of the Committee on Judiciary, Feb. 13, 1964.
15. An Act to Amend Section 46-750.11 of the 1962 S.C.CoDE; Bill No. R941,
S578, approved, Mar. 21, 1964.
1961]
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ist Act is reducing the number of drivers without insurance,
which has the effect of reducing the amount of money available
for the uninsured motorist fund, which, in turn, affects the
amount of payment made to the insurance companies. This in
itself would be satisfactory but for one thing: the rate increases
allowed the insurance companies are granted some time after the
need for the increase arises. Thus, with the inclusion of punitive
damages in the uninsured motorist coverage, the payments by
the insurance carriers will increase "today," but the rate increases
to cover the additional losses will be granted in the distant fu-
ture and, at the same time, the payments from the fund will be
decreasing. The necessary result of this will be an increased
burden on the insurance companies.
On the other hand lies the fact that most claims for punitive
damages under the Uninsured Motorist Act have been paid by
the insurance carriers to promote public relations; and while the
statutory inclusion of punitive damages will increase the claims
for such damages, it may not be such an increase as will unduly
harm the carriers.
Only time and experience under the law can provide support
or rebuttal to either theory. Meanwhile, the law remains: in
South Carolina, the term "damages," with regard to the Unin-
sured Motorist Act, "shall include both actual and punitive
damages." ''x
RoBERT W. DmBim, JR.
16. Sipra, footnote 15.
[Vol. 16
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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-THE POWER OF A DIS-
TRICT JUDGE TO CUT TAX COSTS FOR THE TRANSPORTA-
TION OF WITNESSES TO TRIAL FROM PLACES WITHOUT
THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT AND MORE THAN 100
MILES DISTANT
Farmer 'v. Arabian American Oil Co. (2d Cir. 1963)
The plaintiff, Farmer, brought this action against The Ara-
bian American Oil Co. (Aramco) for the breach of an employ-
ment contract. At the first trial there was a directed verdict for
Aramco which was subsequently reversed by the circuit court
on appeal necessitating a second trial. Aramco prevailed at the
second trial and recovered a judgment for costs which included
a substantial sum for the transportation of witnesses from Saudi
Arabia. On a motion by Farmer the costs were considerably
reduced to a uniform allowance of $.08 per mile per witness for
100 miles going and returning from the place of trial. From this
ruling Aramco appealed raising the issue of the applicability
of the 100 mile limitation of the taxing of transportation costs
of witnesses. HELD: The allowance by the judge at the first
trial of the total cost of transportation of witnesses from Saudi
Arabia was proper as an exercise of the discretion of the presid-
ing judge. The 100 mile rule is not applicable as a restraint upon
the exercise of judicial discretion in assessing transportation
costs of witnesses. Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 324 F.2d
359 (2d Cir. 1963).
The 100 mile rule is a limitation imposed on the courts by judi-
cial precedent rather than by statute;' the general rule is that
mileage of witnesses may only be taxed as costs as far as the wit-
ness may be reached by subpoena or if outside the district, 100
miles from the place of the trial.2 This limitation was derived
from Rule 45 (e) (1) 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
1. See Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Laboratories, Inc., 232 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1956); Barnhart v. Jones, 9 F.R.D. 423 (S.D. W.Va. 1949);
Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 10 F.R.D. 248 (S.C. Mich. 1950).
2. Spiritwood Grain Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 179 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1950);
Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Lee v. Pennsyl-
vania R. R., 93 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Barnhart v. Jones, 9 F.R.D.
423 (S.C. W.Va. 1949).
3. Rule 45(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(e) Subpoena for a Hearing or Trial.
(1) At the request of any party subpoenas for attendance at a hearing
or trial shall be issued by the clerk of the district court for the attendance
of a witness at a hearing or trial may be served at any place within the
district, or at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of the
place of the hearing or trial specified in the subpoena; and, when a statute
9
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which limits the distance from the place of the trial within which
a subpoena may be served. According to the court in Barnhart v.
Jones4 this limitation on the effect of a subpoena served outside
the district would seem to imply that Congress intended to limit
the taxation of mileage costs to the same distance. The court
further pointed out that, in a country the size of the United
States, if unlimited mileage were permitted, there would be a
considerable burden placed upon the conduct of litigation: situa-
tions might arise in which the costs awarded would be greater
than the recovery. This would be in derogation of the principle
that economy is desirable in litigation. The statement universally
held to represent this rule is that mileage recoverable by wit-
nesses is taxable to the full extent of the distance they can be
reached by subpoena, but not more than 100 miles.5 However,
this statement has been considered erroneous as failing to distin-
guish between the effective range on the service of a subpoena
within or without the district, so that in the case of a witness
from outside the district, mileage allowable should be that which
was travelled in and out of the district up to 100 miles, which
ever is greater."
The 100 mile limitation has been sharply criticized as having
no basis either in the statute or in the realities of modern trials
where it is fairly commonplace for witnesses to come from places
more than 100 miles distant from the place of the trial.1 Many
earlier cases held that the successful party would be entitled to
have the mileage costs of its witnesses taxed beyond the limits
of a subpoena or for the entire distance the witnesses would have
to travel, regardless of the fact that they may have been required
to attend from out of the district or state.8 At present the strict
application of the 100 mile rule is no longer universal. In 1956
the Ninth Circuit allowed transportation costs from the point
where the witness entered the district to the place of the trial-
of the United States provides therefor, the court upon proper application
and cause shown may authorize the service of a subpoena at any other
place.
4. 9 F.R.D. 423 (S.D. W.Va. 1949).
5. See Friedman v. Washburn Co., 155 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1946).
6. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., supra note 1.
7. Bennett Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959); Maresco v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 167 F. Supp.
845 (E.D. N.Y. 1958); Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp.
924 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
8. The Governor Ames, 187 F. 40 (1st Cir. 1911); Jesse D. Carr Land &
Livestock Co. v. United States, 118 F. 821 (9th Cir. 1902); The City of
Augusta, 80 F. 297 (Ist Cir. 1897); Morris-Turner Livestock Co. v. Director
General of R.R., 266 F. 600 (DMont. 1920).
[Vol. 16
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about 250 miles.9 The district court for the Southern District of
New York allowed as taxable costs the lowest first class rate of
transportation to each of three witnesses residing in England,
the observation of the court being that the 100 mile limitation
was unrealistic. 10 This decision was confirmed one year later by
the same court." The Eastern District of New York followed
suit and allowed recovery for transportation of one witness from
Oregon and one from Colombia.2 Thus, the authorities are di-
vided on this issue and since no circuit court opinion is binding
on another and certiorari has been granted by the United States
Supreme Court it would be well to consider the relative merits
of the various positions and the provisions in the United States
Code.
The better rule is the one allowed by the majority in the deci-
sion under discussion. According to 28 U.S.C.A. 1920(3), "A
judge or clerk or any court of the United States may tax as costs
the following :--Fees and disbursements for printing and wit-
nesses." There is no suggestion that there is any limitation on
the mileage allowed to that distance for which a subpoena may
be issued. In fact, reference to 28 U.S.C.A. 1821 amended in
1956 reveals:
• ..that in lieu of mileage allowance provided for herein,
witnesses who are required to travel between the territories
and possessions, or to and from the continental United
States, shall be entitled to the actual expenses of travel at
the lowest first-class rate available at the time of reservation
for passage by means of transportation employed: .. .
This seems to provide specifically for the actual travel expenses
incurred by witnesses. Rule 54: (d), which governs the granting
of costs, states that:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a
statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs; . ..Costs may be taxed by the clerk on
one day's notice. On motion served within 5 days thereafter,
the action of the clerk may be reviewed by the court.
9. Peck, Taxation of Costs in United States District Courts, 42 Nan. L. Rv.
788, 796 (1963).
10. Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., supra note 7.
11. Bennett Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., supra note 7.
12. Maresco v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., supra note 7.
19611]
11
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLNA LAW Evlmw[
The effect of these statutory provisions appears to give the
court discretionary power to tax as much of the costs of litigation
against the defeated party as it deems just, or even to apportion
the costs among both parties regardless of which party won.
13
This discretionary power of the court is highly important in
considering the desirability of eliminating the 100 mile rule.
Under the English practice the prevailing party would be
entitled to all the costs including the attorney's fees as a matter
of right on the theory that this would make him whole. However,
the American practice has been to limit the amount of recover-
able costs to a strictly nominal amount, the reasoning being that
to burden the defeated party with the total cost of the litigation
would tend to discourage just suits or defenses and would more
than offset any beneficial effect to be gained by the discourage-
ment of unjust claims.14 This argument appealed to the dissent-
ing justices in the instant case, and if it were not for the fact
that the court may exercise considerable discretion in the matter
of costs, it would constitute a compelling reason for not extend-
ing taxable costs. Since there is this discretion, there is little
reason to worry about the impecunious litigant being over-bur-
dened with costs. There is a further safeguard in that this discre-
tionary allowance of the court is reviewable, which is apparent
from the decision of the court in the present case. The practice
of courts in allowing the discretion of the judge to be unin-
hibited by the 100 mile rule is one that should be continued,
restricted only by the right of appeal. The advantages of such
a practice are obvious. At present, court calendars are congested
and there is the ever-present problem of the bad-faith litigant
for which there is no real remedy on behalf of either party to
the action except the award of costs, which are nominal at pres-
ent, or a suit for malicious prosecution which is largely ineffec-
tive. 15 In view of the fact that the costs normally awarded are
nominal anyway, the bad faith litigant will not be deterred.'
By allowing discretion in the matter of transportation costs of
witnesses, the judge, on the basis of his familiarity with the
parties before him, their financial status and whether or not the
litigation was prosecuted with a reasonable degree of good faith,
can award costs on a basis that will be better suited to the indi-
13. Moore, Federal Practice and Procedure, sec. 25.06, at 1864-65 (1962);
3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Rules and Procedure, sec. 1196, at 52 (1958).
14. 6 Moore, Federal Practice sec. 54.70(2), at 1304-05 (2d ed. 1953).
15. Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53
COLUm. L. REv. 78 (1953).
16. Id. at 82.
[Vol. 16
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vidual situation before him. In the event that the losing party is
particularly impecunious or acted in good faith, the judge may
tax minimum costs or none at all, whereas in the case of a litigant
acting in bad faith or merely to harass a weaker litigant the
judge may tax the maximum costs allowable.
Finally, the purpose of the Federal Statute, as stated in a
memorandum accompanying the bill to the Senate Judiciary
Committee from the Assistant Attorney General, was to increase
the fees, subsistence, and travel allowances of witnesses to bring
them in line with present-day costs. Attention was called to the
fact that many witnesses were suffering financial loss as a result
of not being adequately compensated for their time or expenses.
The Assistant Attorney General made the further recommenda-
tion that for overseas travel witnesses should be allowed their
actual expenses at the lowest first class rate available, pointing
out that there had been times when witnesses had been required
to engage in such travel at personal financial sacrifice.17
Although the prevailing view in this country at the time of
this writing is that the mileage allowance for witnesses is limited
to the distance at which they can be reached by subpoena, the
better view would be to allow the entire cost of transportation of
witnesses to be recovered subject only to the discretion of the
presiding judge. In this way there will be more adequate recovery
for the prevailing party which, after all, was the original reason
for taxing costs, 18 and much unnecessary litigation will be elim-
inated.
ROBERT M. EmRoR, JR.
17. 1949 United States Code Cong. Service, 1231, 1233.
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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - ASSIGNMENT OF
INCOME PRINCIPLES NOT APPLICABLE TO FARMING
CORPORATION DISTRIBUTING ASSETS IN
LIQUIDATION
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc. (9th Cir. 1963)
In 1956 a California corporation, South Lake Farms, Inc., was
engaged in large-scale farming operations involving more than
76,000 acres. The corporation reported income on the permitted
accrual basis in which crops unharvested at the end of each fiscal
year were not inventoried or otherwise included in gross income
until the following year when harvested.' Non-stockholders
organized a new corporation, South Lake Farms, for the purpose
of purchasing all the stock of the old corporation. After the
transaction, by which the iew corporation became the sole share-
holder of the old, a plan of dissolution and complete liquidation
of the old corporation was adopted. All the assets of the old
corporation were distributed and transferred to the purchasing
corporation without any payment to the old corporation by the
new corporation.
2
The distributed assets consisted in part of an unharvested cot-
ton crop and preparations made on lands for a projected barley
crop, the value of which was taken into account in fixing the
purchase price of the old corporation's stock. The old corporation
deducted the expenses of planting the cotton crop and preparing
the barley land from its income for its last fiscal period and
reported a net operating loss.
The Commissioner determined that there was a deficiency in
the old corporation's income tax for its last fiscal period and
attempted to include the fair market value of the cotton and
barley lands in the income of the corporation for its last taxable
period. The Tax Court refused to allow the inclusion in South
Lake Farms, Inc.3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower decision as "correct for the reasons stated by it."
HELD: the fair market value of an unharvested crop and pre-
pared fields distributed in liquidation, the expenses of which
were deducted, are not includable in income of the corporation.
South Lake Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.
1963).
1. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(c)(2).
2, Such a transaction is treated for tax purposes in INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 334(b).
3. 36 T.C. 1027 (1961).
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The Commissioner had taken alternative positions before the
Tax Court: first, that the income of the old corporation for its
last fiscal period should be increased by nearly two million dol-
lars, representing the value of the cotton crop and of the lands
prepared for a barley crop; second, that if the amount of the
first determination were not includable, then the income of the
old corporation should be increased by approximately seven-hun-
dred thousand dollars, which represented the related expenses
deducted for the past two fiscal years. In support of the first
position the Commissioner invoked section 446 (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 to the effect that where the method of
accounting employed does not properly reflect the income of the
taxpayer, the Commissioner or his delegate may require a method
which will clearly reflect income. On this issue the petitioner
maintained that the Commissioner's calculation of the corpora-
tion's income would defeat the purpose of section 336 of the Code
which provides that no gain or loss is to be recognized to a
corporation in liquidation. The Tax Court refused to recognize
the value of the cotton crop and land preparation as "income":
To the time of dissolution of the old corporation, no income
had been received by or accrued to it with respect to the
cotton crop or the land preparation. Although through ex-
penditures incurred by it the old corporation owned a val-
uable unharvested cotton crop and owned and held under
lease land which was more valuable because it had been
prepared for the planting of a barley crop, neither of these
items representing taxable income to the old corporation
either earned, realized, received, or accrued. At most, they
merely represented property being held by the old corpora-
tion for future disposition or utilization.
4
The Commissioner also relied on assignment of income prin-
ciples, typically invoked where a taxpayer attempts to escape
liability for income earned by assigning it to another.5 The Tax
Court refused to apply the assignment of income principle to the
SoutA Lake situation and relied on Elsie BoRele,6 a case in
which a father made a gift to his children of an unharvested
wheat crop and deducted the related expenses incurred in the
operation. The court held that the income from the crop was not
4. Id. at 1038.
5. E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1930).
6. 22 T.C. 459 (1954).
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15
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SoumH CAioiNA LAW REvmw
taxable to the donor and allowed the deduction. Relying on
BoRelle the court said:
In the instant case, the ownership of the land and the lease-
holds on the land on which the unharvested cotton crop stood
and on which the land preparation had been made was trans-
ferred by the old corporation to the purchasing corporation
when the former distributed its property in complete liqui-
dation to the latter and by the same distribution the owner-
ship of the cotton crop and the land preparation likewise
was transferred. Since in the SoRelle case the transfer of
the ownership of the land and a mature but unharvested
wheat crop thereon was held to prevent the inclusion in the
income of the father of the fair market value of the wheat
crop at the time of the transfer, we think for a like reason
the value of the cotton crop and the land preparation here
involved is not properly includable in the taxable income of
the old corporation. . . . In the BoRelle case the father,
whose basis for reporting income was an accrual basis, de-
ducted in his income tax return the cost of planting and
raising the wheat crop there involved but that fact did not
preclude the holding that the income resulting from the sale
of the wheat belonged to the children and was taxable to
them and not to the father.7
The Tax Court also refused to follow the Commissioner's alter-
native position that the income of the corporation should be in-
creased by the amount of the determined expenses attributable to
the crops and land preparation. The Commissioner invoked his
authority under section 482 to reallocate income among organi-
zations owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests. However, the court agreed with the petitioners that
section 334(b) (2) of the Code, allowing liquidation of a cor-
poration and distribution of the assets to be treated as a single
transaction with a single capital gain tax, prevented resort to the
reallocation provision of section 482:
. . . [W]e think it . . . clear that under his alternative de-
termination the respondent has not made an allocation of
the expenses of the old corporation here in question to the
purchasing corporation but merely has allowed to the pur-
chasing corporation only the basis for cotton crop and the
basis for the land improvement which it was entitled to
7. 36 T.C. at 1039.
[Vol. 16
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under section 334(b) (2) irrespective of any allocation to
it of expenses of the old corporation.
. . . [He] has not made an allocation to the purchasing
corporation of the expenses in question but merely has dis-
allowed them to the old corporation which he may not do
under section 482.8
The court relied on Chicago & North Western Railway Co.9
cited for the proposition that if a "distribution, apportionment
or allocation" is made, ". . . the section implies a requirement
for an allowance elsewhere of the disallowed deduction."' 0
A recent article characterized the problem of South Lake as
"when the distribution of a potential income item avoids cor-
porate tax thereon, should the corporation nevertheless be al-
lowed the tax benefit of deduction for the costs of producing the
item I" Answering in the negative, the article approved reliance
on section 446 and 482 of the Code as well as the relevance of
assignment of income principles. It maintained that the resultant
tax benefit was not intended by Congress:
It seems clear that the tax advantages permitted in South
Lake were not envisioned when Congress in 1954 enacted the
provisions of sections 334(b) and 337. It may be that other
judges will block such unintended benefits. . . . [T]he
remedy might well be adjustments in the liquidating cor-
poration's final year that would disallow expenses of such
year and, in addition, add to income of such year an amount
equal to expenses deducted with tax benefit in prior years,
thus following much the same approach the courts have
used where a corporation distributes notes which it has pre-
viously written off as worthless.1'2
The prediction that other judges might apply assignment of
income principles to the South Lake situation was not borne out
on the appeal of the Tax Court decision in the instant case.
The Commissioner had abandoned his reliance on section 482
involving related organizations; therefore there was no question
but that the transaction was at arm's length between unrelated
parties. In affirming the lower holding the Court of Appeals
8. Id. at 1042.
9. 29 T.C. 989 (1958).
10. 36 T.C. at 1045.
11. Lyon and Eustace, Assignment of Income; Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by
the P.D. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 295, 411 (1962).
12. Id. at 414-415.
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reinforced the Tax Court's position that the cotton crop and
barley crop preparations were not properly classified as "in-
come." The court relied on Treasury Regulations (1957) section
1. 446-1(c) (1) (ii) for the proposition that "not all of the events
which fix the right to receive the income from the crops had
occurred by the time of liquidation";13 and section 1. 61-4(b)
for the proposition that "crops could not be included in the in-
ventory of the old corporation."
14
The assignment of income principle was not applied for the
reason that income from the crops could not fairly be said to be
accrued or accruable. The Commissioner had not presented any
"method of accounting" requiring the inclusion of the items
involved as income: what had not come into existence could not
be "assigned." Furthermore, the court was of the opinion that
the power granted to the Commissioner under section 446(b)
to require a method of accounting clearly reflecting income
would circumvent the nonrecognition of loss or gain provisions
of section 336--from which it follows that the tax falls on the
actual sellers, the stockholders of the corporation as defined
under section 334(b).
The court recognized that the holding was something of a tax
windfall inasmuch as the stockholders "got a price for their stock
that was enhanced by their corporation's expenditures, which
were deducted from its income, thereby reducing its income taxes,
even though it never got the income that the expenditures were
expected to produce."'5 It might also be pointed out that the
stockholders received payment to be taxed at capital gain rates.
Nevertheless, the court indicated that if the result were unde-
sirable, the remedy lay with Congress since the Code, as was held,
allows the deduction.
A vigorous dissenting opinion characterized the "non-recogni-
tion of gain to transferor corporation and new basis to trans-
feree, and capital gain to old shareholders" as "unjustified,
inequitable, contrary to the intention of Congress and shocking
in its implications.' 16 Such a position implicitly rejects the strict
definition of "income" advanced by the majority. The dissenting
opinion would extend assignment of income principles to the
South Lake situation in spite of the SoRelle decision. The opin-
ion suggested applying "percentage of completion" principles to
13. 324 F.2d at 838.
14. Ibid.
15. 324 F.2d at 840.
16. Id. at 841.
[Vol. 16
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the case at hand by which liquidating construction corporations
are required to report a portion of ultimate profits although the
profit is contingent at the time of liquidation.
17
It is submitted that the majority opinion has the force of
logical and strict construction of statutes behind it. The sugges-
tion that the cure for the alleged tax windfall lies with the legis-
lature is sound. Percentage of completion principles fail in the
Bouth Lake situation for the same reason as do those of assign-
ment of income since both doctrines necessarily presuppose that
the right to receive income has been fixed, that the income is
accrued or accruable.
PAUL R. HmBAM
17. Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1951);
Jud Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946).
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i INSTANTCITATIONS
Something new? Not at all. For more than 90
years Shepard's Citations has been making in-
stantly available to members of the Bench and
Bar the latest citations to their cases and statutes.
At the flick of a wrist - or the flip of a page
- Shepard's Citations shows whether a case or
a statute has been affected by judicial or legisla-
tive action.
The amazing combination of speed and accuracy
in providing vitally important references to legal
authorities has made Shepard's Citations a must
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